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ABSTRACT 
Concentration in airline markets in both the U.S. and the EU is very 
high and has been for decades. Competition authorities on both sides 
of the Atlantic have nonetheless approved mergers and alliances that 
appear to increase the market power of the participating firms. How 
effective is domestic and international airline competition in the 
Atlantic area today, and how effective is prevailing competition 
policy? Is policy conflict likely? These questions are explored in the 
context of a major industry that has historically been more nationally 
protected and controlled than perhaps any other outside of the defense 
sector. Is the industry’s performance likely to improve or diminish? 
We recently concluded a comprehensive study of U.S. and EU 
competition policies, The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, which stresses 
critical differences between the two policy regimes as well as some 
similarities. As industries increasingly globalize, coordination of 
competition policies becomes ever more important, and the potential 
for conflict—the extraterritorial veto power national authorities have 
over foreign practices that affect the home market—cannot be 
ignored. We conclude that, despite some very different underlying 
assumptions and enforcement systems, competition authorities on 
both sides of the Atlantic appear to have developed a similar and 
compatible approach to the airlines that may lead to improved social 
performance without serious policy conflict 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American airline industry has seen a substantial increase in 
overall concentration in the last decade as six legacy carriers have 
been replaced by three.1 Today, the United States (U.S.) domestic 
market is dominated by the three remaining legacy carriers (Delta, 
United, and American) and Southwest, a so-called low-cost carrier. 
Much of the single-market European Union (EU) is dominated by 
firms that are allied with one or more of the three U.S. legacy carriers. 
Most airline routes on both sides of the Atlantic are above the level 
regarded as “highly concentrated” in the language of the U.S. merger 
                                                   
 1. This paper focuses on the U.S. and the EU. Canadian developments are 
interesting in their own right but doing them justice would require more institutional 
discussion than space permits. 
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guidelines. North America and the EU together account for between 
50–60% of global aviation,2 although this share is declining.3  
Does the present level of concentration in the U.S. domestic and 
transatlantic markets mean, as some have argued, that effective 
competition has diminished significantly over recent years, and that 
the airline industry is likely to demonstrate increasingly 
anticompetitive behavior and increasingly poor performance both 
within each region and between them? Is consumer welfare, 
accordingly, likely to fall? Can the competition policy regimes in the 
U.S. and the EU promote an effective degree of competition by 
pursuing only the conventional objectives of controlling concentration 
and entry barriers, or are there alternative ways of fostering 
competitive results? Heavy government regulation was a hallmark of 
the industry’s early history with markedly negative results, so if new 
regulation is considered, it would need to be dramatically different 
from anything yet seen. Do the new phenomena of alliances among 
international carriers presage lower costs, increased volume, and 
lower fares, or do they signal the opposites? These are some of the 
questions addressed in this Article. Our interest in the subject grows 
directly from our consideration of U.S. and EU competition policy in 
The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, where we emphasized differences 
rather than similarities in policy regimes.4 
The airline industry displays uniqueness in many dimensions. It 
has included an inevitable international component since its earliest 
                                                   
 2. See INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., PRESENTATION OF 2016 AIR TRANSPORT 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 4 (2016), https://www.icao.int/annual-report-
2016/Documents/ARC_2016_Air%20Transport%20Statistics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38QE-KRKB]; see also Guillaume Burghouwt, et al., EU Air 
Transport Liberalisation Process, Impacts and Future Considerations 38 (Int’l 
Transp. Forum, Discussion Paper 2015), https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/dp201504.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZPX-RM4K]. The percentage depends on 
whether activity is measured by value or physical units. See INT’L CIVIL AVIATION 
ORG., supra note 1, at 4. The value number is higher. See id.  
 3. The horizontal merger guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) classify market concentration using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).  The three categories used in the guidelines are: 
unconcentrated (HHI below 1500), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1500 and 
2500), or highly concentrated (HHI above 2500).  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RX6-
XVWF].  Concentration levels in the U.S. are discussed in Daniel J. Gifford & Robert 
T. Kudrle, U.S. Airliners and Antitrust: The Struggle for Defensible Policy Towards 
a Unique Industry, 50 IND. L. REV. 539, 539-41 (2017). The U.S. and EU alliance 
structure is discussed infra in Section III.C of this Article. 
 4. See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN 
ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION IN US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 1 (2015).  
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days, yet much of it remains partially protected by nationally specific 
regulations that severely limit foreign participation in routes and 
ownership.5 In antitrust analysis, city-pairs (a route between two 
cities) are generally treated as the most relevant markets. In most 
countries, city-pairs are more concentrated than the overall level of 
concentration. In the U.S. today, concentration levels in many city-
pair markets would be classified as highly concentrated under the 
merger guidelines: Dallas/Chicago: HHI 3031; Denver/Philadelphia: 
HHI 3397; and Los Angeles/Boston: HHI 2595.6 The merger 
guidelines regard all markets bearing an HHI index of 2500 or more 
(as all of these markets do) as highly concentrated.7 And in Europe the 
city-pair concentration is typically much higher.8 But despite 
concentration indicia suggesting market power, the major carriers on 
both sides of the Atlantic until recently have had a dismal profit 
history.9 In nearly every national market, the major carriers have 
experienced chronic losses, often leading to bankruptcy and merger or 
exit.10  
The secular growth of air travel has been far higher than GDP 
growth rates in most markets, yet the intertemporal variation in output 
has been very high, contributing largely to the observed profitability 
problems.11 Finally, the connection between air transport and public 
                                                   
 5. See the discussion of the Chicago Convention and its ramifications in 
Part III infra. 
 6. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared market shares of all firms, 
where (here) a 0.25 share is treated as 25. Authors’ calculations from firm data. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 19. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See William M. Swan, Consolidation in the Airline Industry, available at 
cyberswans.com/AirlineIndustryPubs/Consolidation/ConsolidationPaper.doc 
[https://perma.cc/49D4-4RSQ ] (Swan is a Boeing economist). 
 9. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 543. On the financial condition of 
European airlines, see Alex Dichter, Sybren Hahn & Dominic Maxwell, Winter is 
Coming: The Future of European Aviation and How to Survive It (2015), available at 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-
insights/winter-is-coming-the-future-of-european-aviation-and-how-to-survive-it.  
The authors note that, since 1985, aviation has averaged €13 billion per year of 
economic loss. Id. at 7. 
 10. See List of Airline Bankruptcies in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airline_bankruptcies_in_the_United_States 
https://perma.cc/2TQM-Y8MZ]; List of Defunct Airlines of Europe, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_defunct_airlines_of_Europe 
[https://perma.cc/HKY8-6RSZ]. 
 11. See AIRBUS, GLOBAL MARKET FORECAST: GROWING HORIZONS 7 (2017), 
http://airbus-dev63.adobecqms.net/aircraft/market/global-market-forecast.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SX9-8LUS]; INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASSOC., ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 1 (2017), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/ 
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policy is more multifaceted than in almost other industry: The 
combination of publicly controlled or regulated complementary 
facilities such as airports, equipment safety, emergency financial 
bailouts, personnel certification, and airline security are unique to this 
industry.12 
This study looks at the past, present, and future of air passenger 
service in the U.S. and the EU with some attention to the place of the 
Atlantic region in the larger global market. This focus is justified 
because carriers based in the North America and the EU currently 
carry over half of all global traffic.13 Yet these carriers’ fortunes turn 
in part on the entire global market. In 2016, 40.9% of all air traffic 
crossed international borders, and this percentage goes up more than 
6% per year.14 Our central question stems directly from the law and 
economics literature: How viable is competition in the Atlantic area 
airline industry today?  
I. AIRLINES: BRIEF HISTORY AND MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Unlike the case of many modern markets, global trade in air 
services has not just evolved with the decline of general trade 
protection and the development of technology15 but has been 
continually affected by significant legal constraints.16 All international 
air traffic stems from explicit bilateral agreements.17 The U.S. 
dominated the world commercially as well as militarily as World War 
II ended, and fear that such domination in air service would crush non-
U.S. national carriers led to a highly restrictive regime announced at 
the Chicago Conference of 1944.18 Each state maintained complete 
control over its own airspace, and any foreign activity needed approval 
by formal agreement.19 This eventually led to over 3,000 such 
                                                   
economics/IATA-Economic-Performance-of-the-Industry-mid-year-2017-report.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/G9EU-TZB4] 
 12. See Kenneth Button, The Usefulness of Current International Air 
Transport Statistics, 2 J. TRANSP. & STAT. 71, 84 (1999). 
 13. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., supra note 2, at 4. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See KEN BUTTON, THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALISATION ON INTERNATIONAL 
AIR TRANSPORT ACTIVITY: PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 8-9 (2008), 
https://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/greening-transport/41373470.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XAE8-3Z6U]. 
 16. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 35. 
 17. See id. at 44. 
 18. See Kenneth Button, The Impact of US–EU “Open Skies” Agreement on 
Airline Market Structures and Airline Networks, 15 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 59, 60 
(2009). 
 19. See id. 
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agreements, which typically stipulated the names of specific carriers, 
the conditions of their ownership, and the nature of permission by 
flight frequency and airports. National governments outside of the 
U.S. typically owned their own monopoly “flag carriers.”20 Although 
there are exceptions, outside of the EU, only a handful of states permit 
foreign ownership of national airlines to exceed 50%, even today.21 
(The EU is a special case in which the Union has effectively succeeded 
to the rights of each of its member states.)22 This caution reflects 
national security and safety concerns, but it also prevents nationals 
from a third state from benefiting from existing bilateral agreements 
if an airline were to change hands.23 
The post-war developments of American and European based 
airlines differ in one major respect: While the increased use of the 
market mechanism for air travel in Europe has accompanied 
widespread privatization since around 1980, U.S. airlines were private 
throughout.24 Those changes in Europe were elements of the broader 
melding of the European economies. By 1997, national restrictions on 
intra-EU airline activity were no longer permitted, i.e., a Paris-based 
carrier had the same rights in Germany as one based in Berlin.25 
Non-negligible air travel before the Second World War outside 
of North America and Europe was mainly in Australia, Japan, and 
Latin America. These areas account for only a minor share of carriers 
and traffic today. Instead, new airlines based in Taiwan, China, 
Singapore, and the Gulf have become major factors in the global 
marketplace. Emirates is now the fourth largest airline by scheduled 
passenger miles flown and China Southern the eighth 26 This rise has 
been driven by a combination of local entrepreneurship, protection, 
and increasing regional demand.27 Whereas North America and 
Europe accounted for 63% of all air traffic in 1995,28 this dropped to 
53% by 2016.29  
                                                   
 20. See id. at 63. 
 21. See id. at 63-64. 
 22. The Union requires all member states to afford equal protections to all 
member states. Within the EU, therefore, airlines registered in any EU state must be 
treated by each member state as a domestic airline. 
 23. See Button, supra note 18, at 63, 70. 
 24. See id. at 62. 
 25. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 14. 
 26. See Flight Global, World Airline Rankings 2017, 6 (2017), 
https://www.flightglobal.com/asset/18223 [https://perma.cc/R7KN-MZG3]. 
 27. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 42. 
 28. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Annual Report of the Council 1995 1, 2 
(1995), https://www.icao.int/Documents/annual-reports/rp95_en.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/HNU4-WU9Q] 
 29. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., supra note 2, at 4.  
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II. AIRLINES AS AN INDUSTRY 
A. Airline Costs 
The regulation and national ownership of airlines were originally 
linked to national security and safety.30 Safety concerns underlie part 
of the extraordinary volume of data collected about virtually every 
aspect of the airline industry worldwide. In the U.S. and in many other 
jurisdictions, this includes cost data from individual carriers that are 
unusually accurate and detailed. 
A major concern about the airline industry at the time that the 
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board began its regulation of fares and routes 
in 1938 was the possibility that the industry might suffer from a 
tendency towards “destructive competition” due to high fixed costs 
and low marginal costs.31  High fixed costs are especially problematic 
for an industry such as air transport, which is subject to wide variations 
in demand.32 Although some writers have taken this approach,33 
Borenstein and Rose have pointed out that the industry is in fact not 
unusual in its capital intensity.34 Rather, they have contended that its 
vicissitudes historically stemmed from a confluence of erratic fuel 
costs and huge swings in final demand interacting with dubious 
business models by major firms that for decades typically implied 
route expansion in good times and huge losses in downturns.35  
The relation of service volume to costs has been studied from 
many perspectives. One is the load factor: How close to passenger 
capacity does a plane fly? In the U.S., the average number moved from 
around 50% at the dawn of deregulation to 84.1% in 2017.36 In Europe, 
load factors with increasing liberalization similarly moved to about 
                                                   
 30. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 36. 
 31. See JAMES J. LYNCH, AIRLINE ORGANIZATION IN THE 1980S: AN INDUSTRY 
REPORT ON STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES FOR COPING WITH CHANGE 65-66 (1984) 
(urging enactment of regulatory legislation over the airline industry to “prevent the 
spread of bad practices and of destructive and wasteful tactics resulting from the 
intense competition now existing within the air-carrier industry”); Roger G. Noll, 
Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1254, 1257 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
 32. See ELDAD BEN-YOSEF, THE EVOLUTION OF THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY: 
THEORY, STRATEGY AND POLICY 106 (2005). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . . 
or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 63, 105-06 (Nancy L. Rose ed. 2014). 
 35. See id. at 112-14. 
 36. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 2017 Semi-Annual and June U.S. Airline Traffic 
Data, https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/2017-semi-annual-and-june-us-airline-traffic-
data [https://perma.cc/8M4R-WVUZ]. 
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the same level as the U.S. in recent years.37 Holding the load factor 
and route structure constant, cost declines due to a larger aircraft or 
closer seating are elements of economies of density.38 Savings from 
the greater density achieved by substituting larger aircraft for smaller 
aircraft dwarf savings from scale economies attained by extending a 
given flight to a more distant destination.39 Costs can drop by 15% 
with a doubling of passengers throughout, while economies of scale 
gained from simply increasing destinations without a change in 
density are minor.40 
In the U.S., low-cost carriers (LCCs) have traditionally been 
distinguished from “legacy” carriers.41 The legacy carriers are those 
that were operating under the supervision of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) during the regulatory period from 1938 to 1978.42 These 
terms (“low cost” and “legacy”) suggest that the cost advantage that 
the later-entering LCCs have had over the legacy carriers is a result of 
the high labor cost structure that the legacies developed during the 
regulatory period. This cost advantage is narrowing, however, nearly 
all of the legacies have gone through Chapter 11 bankruptcy since the 
beginning of the new century with the resulting institution of major 
changes in labor practices.43  
The hub-and-spoke structure of the legacy carriers 
unanticipatedly emerged after deregulation as an efficient way to serve 
the large number of medium-size cities that are core markets for the 
legacies.44 Under a hub-and-spoke system, passengers are gathered at 
hubs, enabling most of their trip to be carried out by large aircraft, 
thereby increasing economies of density.45 For any given non-hub 
origin and initial hub, the total journey cost declines with the distance 
to a second destination hub. 
                                                   
 37. See IATA, Strong Passenger Demand, Record Load Factor in February 
(Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2017-04-06-01.aspx. 
 38. See Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen & Michael W. Tretheway, 
Economies of Density Versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local Service 
Airline Costs Differ, 15 RAND J. ECON. 471, 474 (1984). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id.; see also BIJAN VASIGH, KEN FLEMING & THOMAS TACKER, 
INTRODUCTION TO AIR TRANSPORT ECONOMICS: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATIONS 125-
26 (2d ed. 2013). A doubling of passengers reduces fixed cost per passenger by half.  
See Jan K. Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Economies of Traffic Density in the 
Deregulated Airline Industry, 37 J. L. & ECON. 379 (1994) for an assessment of the 
impact of density on airline costs. 
 41. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 80. 
 42. See id. at 64, 66. 
 43. See id. at 88. 
 44. See id. at 88-89. 
 45. See id. at 89. 
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Despite typically great differences in general population density 
between Europe and the U.S., the hub-and-spoke system also 
developed in Europe.46 In both the U.S. and Europe, LCCs generally 
fly on point-to-point routes between selected cities.47 LCCs typically 
employ their own computer booking systems, offer only unassigned 
economy class seats, and make ancillary charges for anything beyond 
the cost of passage.48 LCCs also realize lower operational costs by 
employing only a limited range of aircrafts, which has impeded their 
entry into the transatlantic market.  
LCC base fares are far lower than those of the firms called 
“legacy” carriers in the U.S. and “full service” carriers (FSCs) in 
Europe. In fact, one European classification puts firms with fares of 
50% of the “full-service” price into the “low-cost” category. Using a 
similar scheme, there were ten low-cost carriers based in the EU in 
2017 but only five full-service carriers: British Airways, KLM-Air 
France, Lufthansa, Finnair, and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). 
LCC Ryanair grew to overtake Lufthansa in 2016 as the largest carrier 
in Europe.49 By 2015 LCCs accounted for 48% of total seat capacity 
in the EU while the FSCs offered fewer seats than in 1998.50 
In the U.S. there are now only three legacy or full service 
carriers: Delta, United, and American.51 And the best known U.S. 
LCC, Southwest, has had a larger U.S. passenger volume than any of 
the legacy three in some recent years at about 20% (American was 
slightly larger than Southwest in 2017) with no other LCC above about 
5%.52 Although Southwest is taking on some the of the legacy carriers’ 
characteristics, such as developing some hubs and a business class, it 
                                                   
 46. See, e.g., German Aerospace Center Release 1.01, Analyses of the 
European Air Transport Market: Airline Business Models ¶ 3.3 (2008) (Development 
at Different Airports – Hub vs. Secondary Airports). 
 47. See, e.g.,  Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 27-30. 
 48. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 95-96. 
 49. Lufthansa, however, at least temporarily overtook Ryanair in 2017 as 
Europe’s largest carrier, after Ryanair was forced to cut thousands of flights because 
of pilot rostering problems.  Ryanair Loses Europe’s Largest Airline Crown to 
Lufthansa, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/ 
business/transport-and-tourism/ryanair-loses-europe-s-largest-airline-crown-to-
lufthansa-1.3350878 [https://perma.cc/L9UR-DR3C]. 
 50. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of Regions on An 
Aviation Strategy for Europe, at 16, COM (2015) 598 final (Dec. 7, 2015). 
 51. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 539-40. 
 52. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Airline Domestic Market Share July 2017-June 
2018, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/SC7J-NXS7]. 
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is still generally classified as an LCC, joined by JetBlue, Allegiant, 
and Alaska.53 
B. Airline Demand 
Airline demand differs from that of most products because of 
network effects.54 A large share of the travelling public (mostly 
business travelers) will choose one airline over another because of the 
frequency of flights, and both business travelers and others travelling 
to provincial cities will choose an airline that possesses the ability to 
book complex schedules easily.55 This means, ceteris paribus, that 
large airlines in terms of both volume on particular routes and the 
multiplicity of such routes have a demand advantage.56 And it also 
explains the growth of code-sharing or interline ticket booking (a 
cooperative practice in which one airline books seats on a second 
airline and sells them as its own) early in the deregulation period.57 
Without code-sharing, passengers would need to recheck their bags 
with a change of carrier.58 But even arm’s length cooperation—like no 
cooperation at all—presents the problem of “double marginalization,” 
the phenomenon in which the price of each part of the trip is set 
without regard for the diminished demand on the other part.59 In such 
a circumstance, both parts of the journey are priced excessively for 
joint profit maximization, and closer coordination can improve both 
seller and buyer welfare.60 
The income elasticity of demand for air travel is fairly high. 
Estimates have been made by region and length of haul––longer 
journeys tend to be more elastic, and for most countries they range 
from 1.5-2.0.61 Market-wide price elasticities are quite low: At the 
                                                   
 53. See Dipasis Bhadra & Pamela Texter, Airline Networks: An Econometric 
Framework to Analyze Domestic U.S. Air Travel, 7 J. TRANSP. & STAT. 87, 89 (2017). 
 54. See Severin Borenstein, Trends: Pray for JetBlue, MILKEN INST. REV. 5, 
7 (2014). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 76. 
 58. Without a code-sharing or similar agreement, the two or more airlines 
carrying a passenger on separate segments of a trip would be contracting separately 
with the passenger for their respective segments.  Each carrier, accordingly, would be 
responsible only for its own segment. 
 59. See William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants 
to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 458 (2012). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See MARK SMYTH & BRIAN PEARCE, AIR TRAVEL DEMAND: IATA 
ECONOMICS BRIEFING NO. 9-10 (2008), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/ 
documents/economics/air_travel_demand.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C85-FBWQ]. 
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national level most estimates are less than one.62 This, of course, still 
allows for very high price cross elasticities across carriers on the same 
route.63 In addition, there is price discrimination across different 
classes of passengers with business passengers paying a much higher 
mark-up over the cost of service than others.64 Although only the North 
American and European markets have been studied in detail, these 
general characteristics seem very likely to apply globally.65  
C. From Cost and Demand to Market Conditions 
Classic industrial organization analyses stress market structure 
and consequent firm conduct to explain overall market performance.66 
This paradigm has seen some revision over the decades, particularly 
by making structural characteristics endogenous and firm conduct less 
predictable,67 yet the categories remain intuitive and analytically 
useful.  
Structural characteristics include concentration, barriers to entry, 
and product differentiation.68 The concern about concentration is 
twofold: All else equal, the smaller the number of firms in the market, 
the greater their likely recognition of mutual dependence and the less 
likely they are to engage in easily matched competitive behavior that 
will leave each participant worse off.69 In addition, where increasing 
market concentration leads firms to sell substitute products that 
previously were competing, those products can be jointly priced 
within the firm to maximize profits.70  
Following deregulation in the U.S. there was a spate of entry 
followed by exits and consolidation.71 After the late eighties, the 
national market structure stabilized and aggregate concentration 
                                                   
 62. See id. at 25. Both income and price elasticities are calculated by asking 
what would happen if price or income changed by one percent over the range in 
question, holding all other factors constant.  
 63. See id. at 10. 
 64. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, supra note 3, at 548-49. Of 
course, business travelers are receiving value for their higher fares in the frequencies 
of flights and the large networks available to them. See id. 
 65. See SMYTH & PEARCE, supra note 61, at 10. 
 66. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 244 (4th ed. 2005). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 9 (1995). 
 70. See Gillespie & Richard, supra note 59, at 458. 
 71. See MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 69, at 8-9. 
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varied only slightly72 until the three major mergers of the past few 
years (Northwest-Delta, United-Continental and American–US Air). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)73 of 1,404 for U.S. airlines 
measured by passenger miles in 2013 indicates an un-concentrated 
market.74 The 2013 EU-wide index was only 524.75 EU-wide 
concentration figures over time must be used with care because 
complete international freedom within the EU for EU-based carriers 
was established only in 1997.76 But the relevant market for 
competition policy in the airlines is acknowledged to be the city-pair, 
so broader concentration figures have only limited meaning.77  
Considering the more relevant route-level concentration, data 
have been calculated for the U.S. for both hub and non-hub routes.78 
Routes from the twelve major hubs were somewhat less concentrated 
than other routes until the mid-eighties, at which point they became 
more concentrated by 1989.79 The HHIs of these hubs stood at 4,800, 
and the HHIs of non-hubs stood at 4,000.80 This was followed by hub 
deconcentration in recent years so that the index for both groups is 
now closer to 4,000.81 Even at this lower number, the index remains in 
the highly concentrated category.82 
One study of the U.S. in 2014 concluded: “[N]early 90 percent 
of all passengers traveled on city-pairs with HHIs above 2,500, and 
about 40 percent of city pairs have HHIs in excess of 4,000.”83 In 
                                                   
 72. See id. at 8. 
 73. The index is a measure of industry concentration used in the merger 
guidelines of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The index 
is calculated by squaring the percentage market share of each firm in the industry and 
adding them. Id. Therefore, the maximum possible value of a monopoly is 10,000 
(1002). See id. Because the HHI is constructed from the squares of market shares, it 
yields a higher number as shares are larger on average and also as the shares are more 
unequal.  
 74. See European Airline Consolidation to Enhance Financials? Few Deals 
to Be Done, at Least Locally, CAPA (May 15, 2013, 1:52 AM), 
https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/european-airline-consolidation-to-
enhance-financials-few-deals-to-be-done-at-least-locally-109713 
[https://perma.cc/WAB4-Q9YR]. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 14. 
 77. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 102. 
 78. See id. at 91. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 89. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 91. 
 83. FIONA SCOTT MORTON, ET AL., BENEFITS OF PRESERVING CONSUMERS 
ABILITY TO COMPARE AIRLINE FARES 36 (2015), http://3rxg9qea18zhtl6s2u8jammft-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
 How is Competition Policy Coping? 631 
Europe, typical route level concentration is considerably higher: The 
average route had an index of 6,897 in 2015.84  This does not 
dependably translate into a lower level of competition, however. Most 
of the European population lives in regions that are more densely 
settled than the U.S. with major airports far closer together—hence 
providing some competition with each other––and with a much higher 
level of intermodal competition (i.e., trains and busses). Such facts 
have entered into the analyses of EU competition authorities at both 
the national and EU levels.85  
Barriers to entry into the airline industry are considerable but, as 
the various waves of entrants in both Europe and America have 
demonstrated, they are often surmounted. Economies of scale, as 
distinct from economies of density, are not estimated to be large, and 
small-scale entry, sometimes with leased aircrafts, has been frequently 
observed.86 Entry conditions under public control such as gates and 
slots (a slot is the right of an airline to use airspace and ground 
facilities at a particular time) have varied over time and present 
considerable difficulty in some U.S. and many more EU markets, but 
workarounds through the use of secondary airports have often been 
successful.87 “Brand” preference unalloyed by tangible attraction, such 
as better airport facilities and especially loyalty discounts such as 
frequent flyer programs, seem quite modest.88 In fact, in the early years 
of U.S. deregulation, many economists tended to view competition in 
the airline industry through the lens of William Baumol’s theory of 
contestable markets.89 Under this theory, an industry behaves 
competitively if entry and exit into the market are costless.90 Aircrafts 
                                                   
2015/05/CRA.TravelTech.Study_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BG5W-QSPW]. For 
example, an HHI of 2500 in a city-pair market could mean that it is being served by 
four equal-sized airlines, and a market with an HHI of above 4000 could mean that it 
is being served by three airlines of somewhat unequal size. 
 84. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 30. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the 
Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 111, 128 (1984). 
 87. Ryanair, Europe’s largest carrier and an LCC has used mostly secondary 
airports.  See, e.g., TOPICAL REPORT: ANALYSES OF EUROPEAN TRANSPORT MARKET: 
AIRLINE BUSINESS MODELS 22 (2008) (describing use of secondary airports by 
Ryanair). 
 88. See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: 
Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 426-28 (1987). 
 89. See id. at 403-04 (discussing role of contestable market theory during 
airline deregulation and recognizing theorists who applied contestability to the airline 
industry in the early 1980s); see generally William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: 
An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982). 
 90. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The Contestability of 
Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 125, 
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could be moved from one location to another at low cost;91 therefore, 
so the story went, when any airline was able to raise its profits beyond 
a competitive return, those profits would attract entry that would 
compete them away. Thus, market power and sustained, 
supracompetitive returns were impossible in the airline industry.92  
This interpretation of the industry has not prospered, despite the 
(until recently) accurate prediction that incumbent firms would not 
realize sustained profitability.93 The theory’s assumptions were faulty 
and so were some of its main predictions. New airline entrants must 
incur a set of pre-operating and “ramp-up” costs that are “sunk” (that 
is, nonrecoverable) in the event that the entrant leaves the market.94 
Moreover, econometric studies have shown that prices are typically 
somewhat higher when the number of competitors is lower, and that 
the impact of potential competition from legacy carriers alone is 
modest.95 On the other hand, one insight from the approach remains 
important: The price-cost margins typically associated with very high 
concentration can be disciplined by the threat or actual entry by an 
aggressive competitor, such as an LCC.96 This was implicit in the 
earliest industrial organization literature but was not stressed.97 
In both the U.S. and Europe, low-cost carriers have provided by 
far the most effective competitive force in the industry.98 The 
“Southwest Effect” notes that this firm, which began operating from 
Dallas in 1971 as an intrastate airline that soon moved into adjoining 
states but did not operate with hubs, has exerted a sharp downward 
influence on fares in a market simply by announcing its impending 
                                                   
125 (1981) (applying contestable market theory to city-pair airline markets); see also 
Levine, supra note 88, at 403 (recognizing theorists who applied contestability to the 
airline industry in the early 1980s). 
 91. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 86, at 128.  
 92. See Bailey & Panzar, supra note 90, at 125, 129 (noting airline prices 
were regulated by the possibility of competitors entering the market in 1979–1980 
because the market was “nearly perfectly contestable” and discussing how easy entry 
and exit into markets by new entities keep pricing competitive). 
 93. See the discussion in Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 550-51. For a 
discussion of the financial history of the airline industry, see id., at 543. 
 94. See Levine, supra note 88, at 400.  
 95. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 121.  
 96. See id. 
 97. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 299-300 (1959).  
 98. They have played an even larger role in some low-income countries. 
Note, for example, that both prior to the three recent mergers (Delta/Northwest, 
United/Continental, American/US Air) and after, the largest carrier in the U.S. was 
Southwest, an LCC widely known for its low fares.  See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 
3, at 551, 578. The same is true for Europe where the largest carrier is Ryanair, an 
LCC also widely known for its low fares. See discussion supra, text accompanying 
note 50.                                                                                      
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entry.99 In recent years, Southwest’s costs and its prices appear to have 
risen relative to the legacy carriers.100 But JetBlue, another of the 
LCCs, has grown to be the fifth largest U.S. domestic carrier,101 and, 
along with Spirit Airlines, produces strong downward pricing pressure 
on the legacy carriers that compete with them.102 
In sharp contrast to the impact of impending or actual entry by 
LCCs, U.S. data suggest that the competitive impact of legacy carriers 
with each other has declined over time.103 One study found that a 
change from three to two carriers on a route in 2000 increased prices 
by 4%, but a similar change produced negligible price increase by 
2008.104 Similarly, a shift from two to one raised prices by 12% in 2000 
but only by 3.9% in 2010.105 Severin Borenstein has interpreted such 
evidence as suggesting that markets with two or even three firms are 
already engaging in full monoploid pricing.106 This is consistent with 
a decline in experimentation with alternative business models and the 
acceptance of mutual forbearance with price leadership, a standard 
outcome in many oligopoly markets dealing in similar products.107 But 
this still leaves each airline with some price discrimination latitude 
among its own offerings based on estimated demand elasticities across 
                                                   
 99. See Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond to 
the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines 2 (NBER, Working Paper No. 
11072, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11072 [https://perma.cc/9FFT-QKJS]. 
 100. See Vinay Bhaskara, Has “The Spirit Effect” Replaced “The Southwest 
Effect?”, AIRWAYS (July 20, 2013, 9:07 AM), https://airwaysmag.com/industry/has-
the-spirit-effect-replaced-the-southwest-effect/ [https://perma.cc/NSW4-MALZ]. 
 101. Jetblue is the fifth largest U.S. carrier, behind Southwest, American, 
United, and Delta. See On-Flight Market Passengers Enplaned by Unique Carrier for 
2015, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/E4RV-
7V83]. 
 102. See Bhaskara, supra note 100. 
 103. See JAN K. BRUECKNER, DARIN LEE, & ETHAN SINGER, NETWORK VS. 
LCC COMPETITION AND AIRFARES: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE US 4 (2010), 
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Brueckner_ 
Competition_Fares.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9BW-68RH]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Borenstein, supra note 54, at 10. 
 107. U.S. carriers were enjoined from a particular mechanism of price 
coordination based on announcement of intended price change by a settlement with 
DOJ in 1994. See generally Press Release, U.S Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Settles Airlines Price Fixing Suit, May Save Consumers Hundreds of Millions of 
Dollars (Mar. 17, 1994). This still left ample opportunity for price changes to be 
offered and rescinded quickly if they went unmatched. See generally ORG. ECON. 
COOP. & DEV., SUMMARY RECORD OF DISCUSSION, ANNEX TO THE SUMMARY RECORD 
OF THE 121ST MEETING OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE HELD ON JUNE 18-19 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote= 
DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN5/FINAL&doclanguage=en [https://perma.cc/XR4C-
JT57]. 
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passengers.108 And competition takes place in non-price dimensions 
such as gate facilities, clubs, and frequent flier programs. 
Many elements of the European market closely resemble those 
in the U.S.109 This is almost definitionally true with broad cost and 
demand issues, but the competitive behavior pattern is also very 
similar, as the following section confirms. There is little evidence of 
aggressive pricing by FSCs and copious evidence of downward price 
pressure by LCCs.110 
D. Loyalty Programs 
Any attempt to understand the role of loyalty programs in the 
marketing of air travel necessarily raises two important analytical 
points. First, price premia at hub airports reflect the advantages of 
flying from a hub, which are the convenience of a direct flight and the 
direct network access that a hub provides.111 Lederman, however, has 
estimated that at least a quarter of the hub premium represents the 
value of the incumbent airlines’ frequent flyer programs (although 
overall hub premia have declined over time).112 Second, the attraction 
of loyalty discounting cannot be distinguished from other increases in 
travelers’ perceived value of larger networks in the econometric 
studies that the Department of Justice (DOJ) found persuasive in 
approving recent U.S. mergers.113 
There has been much written over the years about the role of 
loyalty programs in discouraging competition in both Europe and 
America.114 Yet Southwest is now the largest domestic U.S. carrier, 
and Ryanair is the largest carrier in the EU.115 Therefore, experience 
                                                   
 108. See ORG. ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 107, at 4. 
 109. This is widely recognized.  See, e.g., Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 
5-6 (discussing U.S. deregulation and EU liberalization). 
 110. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 24. 
 111. See Mara Lederman, Are Frequent-Flyer Programs a Cause of the ‘Hub 
Premium?’, 17 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 35, 36 (2008). 
 112. See id.; see generally Mara Lederman, Do Enhancements to Loyalty 
Programs Affect Demand? The Impact of International Frequent Flyer Partnerships 
on Domestic Airline Demand, 38 RAND J. ECON 1134 (2007).  
 113. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 566-69. 
 114. See, e.g., Ramon Caminal & Adina Claici, Are Loyalty-Rewarding 
Pricing Schemes Anti-Competitive? 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 657 (2007). 
 115. See European Commission, ANNUAL ANALYSES OF THE EU AIR 
TRANSPORT MARKET 2016, 12 (2017) (table top 1.0 airlines by passengers). Southwest 
has long had its own loyalty program, but it attained substantial market penetration 
without it, and Ryanair began its program only in 2017. Southwest began its first 
loyalty program, called The Company Club, in 1987. See Southwest Airlines Media, 
1984-1989, https://www.swamedia.com/pages/1984-to-1989 [https://perma.cc/ 
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on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that a traveler loyalty program 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for competitive success. Moreover, 
such programs are employed by scores of airlines around the world.116 
Our view is that a direct attack on loyalty programs by public policy 
would be a kind of “nuclear option” that should be considered only if 
they can be shown to protect chronic excess profitability, which is very 
far from the record so far. 
E. Two Sets of Players 
A major difference between the U.S. and the EU lies in the 
parallel development of the European airline industry and the EU 
itself.117 More than a dozen substantial private U.S. carriers 
participated in the market when American liberalization began.118 In 
Europe at that time most major states had their own national carrier, 
usually owned by the government.119 The European story is necessarily 
one of discrete national markets dissolving and with them some of the 
national prerogatives agreed upon at the Chicago Convention of 
1944.120 
In July 1992, the European Council adopted Regulation 
2408/92,121 thereby complying with its obligations under previous 
Council Regulation 2343/90 to establish an air transport policy 
abolishing capacity restrictions between Member States by the year’s 
end.122 Regulation 2408/92 effectively postponed the adoption of the 
new policy until April 1, 1997, at which time so-called “cabotage” 
among European airlines was to be implemented, permitting any 
airline registered in a member state of the European Union to offer air 
service in any member state.123 Prior to April 1997, most European 
national airlines operated from one central airport and dealt with intra-
EU traffic on the basis of bilateral agreements aimed at something like 
                                                   
N3EV-H4T8]. Ryanair’s loyalty program began in 2017. See Rachel Gee, Ryanair 
Looks to Grow Loyalty Scheme by Making Membership Automatic, MARKETINGWEEK 
(Nov. 7, 2016, 3:18 PM), 
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 117. See id. at 3. 
 118. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 541. 
 119. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
 120. See id. at 7. 
 121. See Council Regulation 2408/92 of 23 July 1992, On Access for 
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 122. See id. 
 123. See id. art 3. 
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balanced trade.124 Bilateral agreements restricting the number of 
flights and airports were often struck and subsequently adjusted to 
protect the welfare of the dominant flag carrier.125 At least by 1990,126 
however, the European Council had embarked on a transitional policy 
that would take it to the full cabotage policy of 1997.127 The 1997 
liberalization was thoroughgoing: National firms from any member 
state could operate anywhere in the EU without restriction.128 But 
movement by the flag carriers to seize the new opportunities was 
sluggish. In sharp contrast, entry by low-cost carriers was dramatic 
and extensive; the LCC share beyond their country of base registration 
grew to become approximately half of all their operations as their total 
EU market share expanded from 3% in 2001 to 27% in 2013.129 The 
FSCs, like their U.S. legacy counterparts, developed more complex 
hub-and-spoke operations both before and after intra-EU 
liberalization; the LCCs, again like their transatlantic counterparts, did 
not.130 
The share of low-cost carriers in both the U.S. and EU continues 
to grow, but the FSC airlines offer features typically not found with 
LCCs,131 which are valued by many passengers; whether these features 
can sustain their current price premia cannot be confidently forecast. 
Most EU FSCs have either expired or merged, but, like their U.S. 
cousins, the survivors have been experiencing rising profits in the very 
recent past with global economic expansion.132 As this Article will 
argue later, there is little reason for confidence that this can be 
sustained.  
F. Merger Policy 
There are two rationales for mergers, and by extension, for 
alliances short of complete merger: (1) the creation of market power, 
or (2) the generation of efficiencies. Typically, both of these rationales 
                                                   
 124. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Council Regulation 2343/90 on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled 
Intra-Community Air Service Routes and on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity 
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1987, 1987 O.J. (L 371) 76. 
 127. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
 128. See id. at 14. 
 129. Id. at 20. 
 130. See id. at 14. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Press Release, IATA, Strong Airline Profitability Continues in 2018 
(Dec. 5, 2017). 
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are present.133 Democratic governments are generally understood to 
carry the responsibility for fostering social welfare or at least 
consumer welfare.134 Governments should (and usually do) oppose 
mergers and alliances that create market power without compensating 
economic improvements. When a merger or alliance generates both 
market power and efficiencies, governments should block those 
mergers and alliances in which the sum of these effects reduces 
welfare, and they should allow those mergers and alliances where a 
positive consumer welfare effect predominates.135 
As noted, recent scholarship has revealed that the price effects 
resulting from reductions in the number of competitors in city-pair 
markets within the U.S. have been diminishing.136 The causes of these 
effects are unclear. The diminished effects may be the result of the 
airlines’ having already exploited most of their market power, and so 
the merger creates little additional power to exploit; LCC competition 
provides another, complementary, explanation.137 In a recent article, 
Brueckner, Lee, and Singer report that: 
[T]he period between 2000 and 2008 represented a period of tremendous 
growth for LCCs with their collective share of domestic . . . passengers 
increasing by more than half, from 22% to 36% . . . . LCC competition, 
whether it is in-market, adjacent or potential, exerts a dramatic negative 
effect on fares in airline markets.138 
As we have argued elsewhere, a straightforward rationale can be 
offered for why the DOJ approved the three recent mergers: The 
legacy carriers were unlikely either to compete vigorously on routes 
that they share or to enter as contestants beyond their long-established 
basic networks.139 On the other hand, various studies have 
demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that the creation of 
denser route networks can raise welfare.140 By raising the value of a 
typical itinerary to a typical customer, some price rises are consistent 
with overall purchaser welfare gains. In fact, a recent study by Carlton 
                                                   
 133. See Robert Bork’s opinion in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van 
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 134. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 25-28. The appropriate standard 
for this determination in the U.S. is unsettled, but enforcers typically use the consumer 
standard. See id. In the EU, the consumer standard is settled law. See id. 
 135. See id. at 27. 
 136. See BRUECKNER, LEE & SINGER, supra note 103, at 4.  
 137. See Jan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee & Ethan S. Singer, Airline Competition 
and Domestic US Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2 ECON. TRANSP. 1, 7, 11 
(2013). 
 138. Id. at 11. 
 139. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 49.  
 140. See Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller, Airline Networks, Mergers, and 
Consumer Welfare, 48 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 385, 385 (2014). 
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et al. shows both an increase in demand and lower prices on routes 
that had already been served by the merging airlines.141 Such mergers, 
which greatly increase concentration beyond what the merger 
guidelines would ordinarily regard as acceptable, could be justified by 
the guidelines’ recognition of product quality improvements 
anticipated from the merger.142  
In the merger of Delta and Northwest in 2002, the airlines, 
although competitors, each contributed an extensive, non-overlapping 
network to the merged company and thus added significant value that 
would accrue to consumers.143 This increased consumer benefit plus 
the production efficiencies generated by the merger probably more 
than offset the merger’s price effects, which, as noted, were likely to 
be modest.144 The merger of United and Continental in 2010 similarly 
produced significant consumer benefit from network effects and 
efficiencies that in combination offset all or much of the merger’s 
price effects.145 The DOJ, however, additionally required a significant 
freeing up of slots (and three gates) for the benefit of LCCs as a step 
toward increasing competition.146 The merger of American and US Air 
was approved by the DOJ under similar techniques, including the 
mandatory release of slots.147 In these three merger cases, the DOJ’s 
approval appears to have been grounded on the diminishing price 
effects;148 the consumer benefit expected from the network effects and 
merger-generated efficiencies;149 plus, in the last two cases, the 
anticipated competitive effects produced by the slot releases.150 
Consistent with the importance attributed to slot releases by the DOJ 
in its evaluation of domestic mergers, we will see that slot releases 
also play a critical role in the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) 
review of international airline alliances. 
                                                   
 141. See Dennis Carlton, et al., Are Legacy Airline Mergers Pro- or Anti-
Competitive? Evidence from Recent U.S. Airline Mergers, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
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The old national barriers to mergers within the EU involving 
airlines from different EU member states no longer apply. In the so-
called “open skies” cases, the Court of Justice ruled on the lawfulness 
of treaties between the U.S. and certain member states of the EU.151 
The problem arose because those member states that had entered into 
a treaty had acquired rights for their national airlines that were not 
available to airlines from other member states.152 The Court saw this 
as discrimination against the member states that had not entered into 
such a treaty and their airlines.153 In effect the ruling meant that, for 
purposes of airline regulation, the EU as a whole would be treated as 
a single state.154 This development thus changed the rules for mergers 
and potential mergers within the EU, but mergers between an EU-
based airline and an airline from a non-EU country (such as the U.S., 
for example) remained subject to the old rules and remained 
prohibited.155 The Commission, under these new rules, approved the 
merger of British Airways and Iberia in 2010156 and Aer Lingus’s 
takeover by IAG in 2015.157 While intra-EU political boundaries no 
longer constrain mergers between EU airlines, competition rules 
continue to apply.158 It was on these grounds that the Commission 
blocked Ryanair’s attempted takeover of Air Lingus three times.159 
G. Anti-Competitive Conduct 
Following the 1991 Cooperation Agreement and the 1998 
Positive Comity Agreement, transatlantic cooperation is apparently 
very close on price-fixing investigations. Several major airlines were 
involved in price-fixing schemes on air freight a decade ago, and 
                                                   
 151. See generally Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-9528; 
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settlements were reached.160 The DOJ conducted an investigation of 
possible collusion on capacity restraint by the major U.S. carriers in 
2015 and 2016, but that investigation was ultimately dropped for lack 
of evidence.161  
Both the U.S. and the EU pursue cartel cases by extending 
leniency to the first cooperator.162 The EU also offers reduced penalties 
for subsequent cooperation, and the U.S. offers plea bargaining.163 The 
only major differences on airline cartel behavior across the Atlantic 
have nothing to do with this specific industry but inhere in basic legal 
differences between the two legal systems that impede cooperation 
and cannot be easily circumvented: In the U.S., antitrust violations can 
result in criminal sanctions being imposed upon individuals under the 
Sherman Act, and treble damages can be levied in private actions.164 
Neither result is possible in the EU.165 The availability of treble 
damages largely explains why three-quarters of U.S. antitrust cases 
arise in private litigation.166 In EU proceedings, penalties still involve 
only fines levied against firms following a finding of illegality by the 
Commission.167 Compensation for injury caused by an antitrust 
violation is a right recognized by EU institutions, “but its exercise is 
governed by national rules.”168 As a result, according to the 
Commission, “most victims, particularly SMEs [small and medium 
size enterprises] and consumers, rarely obtain compensation.”169 On 
the Commission’s recommendation, however, the European 
Parliament and Council have adopted a directive that attempts to 
reduce the impediments to recovery of damages for injuries caused by 
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antitrust violations.170 The damages issue was brought to a head in the 
air-freight proceedings, which began in 2006, resulting in the 
European Commission’s imposition of substantial fines on a number 
of carriers for concerted price fixing.171 Follow-up actions on behalf of 
the conspiracy’s victims were instituted in several national courts.172 
When the General Court reversed the Commission’s decision for 
internal inconsistencies,173 the damages actions were thrown into 
disarray because the national courts are required to follow the lead of 
the Commission when they consider damages.174  
The EU proceedings highlight differences in the effectiveness of 
European and American antitrust laws to compensate those injured by 
antitrust violations. While the European air cargo litigation was mired 
in unresolved procedural issues, an antitrust class action against the 
air cargo conspirators in the U.S. produced a series of settlements 
totaling $1.2 billion. The EU ultimately also fined the participating 
firms €776 million in 2017, but injury (damage recovery) claims 
remained to be litigated.175 
H. Predatory Behavior 
Several cases in the U.S. have focused on the role of predatory 
pricing as a key element in exclusion, but the usual average variable 
cost standard for incumbents has not prevented effective predation. In 
the EU, where the legal standards governing predatory pricing are 
broad enough to allow greater challenge to questionable pricing 
practices, no predatory pricing cases have been brought by the EU 
Commission against any airline company.  
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In the U.S., the Supreme Court adopted the Brooke Group 
predation standard in 1993,176 although the basic components of that 
standard were known earlier and were imbedded in the Court’s case 
law.177 The Brooke Group standard requires two criteria to be met 
beyond the possession of market power (which would typically be 
indicated by market share): sales below an appropriate measure of cost 
and a likelihood of recoupment.178 The appropriate cost standard was 
undefined in Brooke Group although the Court had earlier suggested 
some version of incremental cost would be satisfactory.179 The lower 
courts generally use average variable cost as the effective boundary 
between predatory and non-predatory pricing.180  
The Brooke Group format was severely tested in the American 
Airlines case.181 The DOJ filed suit against American Airlines in 1999 
for predatory behavior towards several LCCs: Vanguard, Western 
Pacific, and Sunjet, on three routes connecting Dallas-Fort Worth with 
Wichita, Colorado Springs, and Long Beach.182 The district and circuit 
courts attempted as far as possible to follow the scheme established in 
Brooke Group of determining (1) that the incumbent would have 
market power without the additional competition provided by the 
LCCs, (2) that American engaged in pricing below some appropriate 
measure of its costs, and (3) that there was a “dangerous probability” 
of subsequent recoupment of losses incurred during the predatory 
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period.183 (The recoupment issue was cast in “dangerous probability” 
language because the plaintiffs charged American with attempted 
monopolization.)184 American Airlines claimed that it was simply 
meeting competition by matching the lower prices of the LCCs.185 
Both sides attempted to establish whether American actually did price 
below the usually accepted average variable cost standard.186 Although 
the district and circuit courts left the appropriate standard unresolved 
because the DOJ’s cost estimates were rejected,187 the circuit court did 
affirm that the appropriate cost was only additional capacity and not 
opportunity cost.188  
The DOJ argued that American’s increased capacity on the 
contested routes greatly diluted demand for the newcomers’ similarly 
priced product––and therefore constituted a violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act independent of predatory pricing––but the courts did not 
accept the argument.189 Significantly, however, the circuit court did not 
reject DOJ’s contention that predatory pricing in one venue need not 
result in recoupment there alone but instead could plausibly have 
broader profitability impact by signaling the fate of entrants in other 
markets.190 
In 2000, Spirit Airlines sued Northwest Airlines for violating § 2 
of the Sherman Act.191 The pattern again involved lowering prices 
toward that of the entrant while greatly increasing capacity with the 
effect of reducing demand for the entrant’s offering.192 This was 
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followed by a sharp increase in price after the LCC’s withdrawal.193 
Spirit constructed a case that did not involve recoupment beyond the 
Detroit airport.194 Instead, it argued that delays in new entry alone 
would have made Northwest’s price and capacity changes 
profitable.195 Although Spirit’s case was rejected by the district court’s 
summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the 
case for a full trial in 2005.196 Spirit then dropped the case after 
Northwest filed for bankruptcy.197 We are left with no resolution of the 
usefulness of the predatory-pricing doctrine in the airline industry. 
The DOT received many airline predation complaints by the late 
nineties.198 In response, the DOT issued a proposed approach to 
predation in 1999 tailored especially to the airline industry and based 
upon a legal framework different from the one developed by the 
courts.199 The DOT proposal bypassed the prevailing precedent (most 
notably Brooke Group) by not employing price and cost relations at 
all.200 Instead the test would simply be whether or not a capacity 
expansion by a dominant firm costs that firm more revenue than the 
entrant would have diverted from it or costs more than the result of 
either matching the entrant’s fares or establishing the same relative 
fares as with better established entrants elsewhere.201  
Although the DOT’s proposal was based on its legal authority to 
prevent unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of 
competition,202 it did not fare well. Congress responded to the 
Department’s proposal by mandating a study by the National 
Academies’ Transportation Research Board (TRB), which failed to 
endorse the DOT’s policy.203 A Government Accountability Office 
report of 1999 noted that several airlines had criticized the DOT 
proposal’s language as vague, and that the DOT was planning on 
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refining its terminology.204 Finally, in January 2001, the DOT decided 
to deal with predatory behavior in fact-specific adjudications under § 
41712.205 
In the EU, prices below average avoidable cost206 are viewed as 
predatory, costs between average avoidable costs and long run 
incremental costs as subject to question, and prices above that level as 
a safe harbor.207 The enforcing agency for the EU, the European 
Commission, aims to discover a predatory strategy and regards only 
pricing below long-run incremental costs as usually capable of 
foreclosing an equally efficient competitor.208 Although it has 
elsewhere recognized the usefulness of a recoupment test for 
evaluating predatory pricing, the Commission, in its current guidance, 
uses a test of whether a dominant firm has been able to strengthen its 
market power.209  
The major airline predatory pricing case in the EU, Lufthansa v. 
Germania, was handled by the German Bundeskartellamt210 rather 
than DG Comp211 and reveals a very different approach from that of 
the U.S. authorities.212 A small German start-up, Germania, began 
offering a Frankfurt-Berlin one-way ticket in late 2001 at €99 when 
Lufthansa was charging more than four times that amount for a round-
trip flight.213 Lufthansa immediately introduced a €100 one-way 
ticket.214 The German authority attacked the response on three 
grounds. First, the higher quality of the Lufthansa product meant that 
the quality-corrected price was actually lower than Germania’s. 
Second, the introduction of the low price on only one route suggested 
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a possibly predatory strategy. Third, it was argued that the price 
charged by Lufthansa did not cover durchschnittlichen Gesamtkosten 
(average total cost),215 a criterion that seems stricter than that typically 
used in the EU, as noted in the previous discussion, and much higher 
than employed in the U.S. The Bundeskartellamt insisted that the 
Lufthansa price be at least €35 higher than Germania.216 This was 
based on a calculation of an imputed price for the ticket alone, 
subtracting from the total price paid the following amounts for “free” 
customer benefits: €1 for a newspaper, €2 for a soft drink, €12 for 
frequent flier miles, and €25 for higher frequency of flights.217 This 
was followed by a downward adjustment to €35.218 The determination 
of the final (and largest) factor seems particularly problematic. 
Overall, the apparent objective of the remedy was to bar Lufthansa 
from pricing below the quality-adjusted price of the entrant.  
The quality-corrected price seems conceptually confused. The 
issue that the Bundeskartellamt dealt with was whether the Lufthansa 
customer received more for his money than the Germania customer. 
A straightforward resolution of the predatory issue would compare 
prices and costs. There was no dispute about the price of the Lufthansa 
ticket. Therefore, the proper issue is whether Lufthansa sold the ticket 
below its cost. There is no need to adjust price for quality. The 
approach of the Bundeskartellamt appears to be an attempt to follow 
the approach of the Court of Justice, which has ruled that, where 
predatory strategy is shown, it is appropriate to use an average total 
cost standard.219 
There have been many suggested remedies for predatory 
behavior toward entrants that completely ignore price-cost analysis, 
and several have aimed specifically at the airline industry. One of the 
continuing difficulties in this area is a lack of definitional consensus 
on predation. The U.S. Supreme Court defined predation in Brooke 
Group,220 the DOJ tried out a broader definition in the American 
Airlines case,221 the European authorities have formulated definitions 
that downplay recoupment and tend to heighten the importance of 
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intent, and the DOT developed its approach, discussed above.222 In 
addition, Oliver Williamson proposed in 1977 that incumbents not be 
allowed to expand their output for twelve to eighteen months 
following entry,223 while William Baumol suggested two years later 
that incumbents could reduce prices in response to entry but that they 
must then maintain those lower prices for a period following the 
departure of the entrant.224 More recently, Aaron Edlin proposed that 
dominant incumbents be barred from price cuts, capacity expansion, 
or other product improvement until the entrant had succeeded in 
penetrating the market.225 Einer Elhauge subsequently pointed out the 
perverse incentives that could result from Edlin’s rule because the 
incumbent might respond by raising prices to reduce market share to 
a sufficient extent that the constraint was removed.226  
But how serious is the problem in this industry? In an important 
study, Bamberger and Carlton examined data on entry, exit, and prices 
in U.S. city-pair markets from 1991 through 2003.227 While conceding 
that “our analysis cannot rule out isolated instances of predatory 
conduct,” aggregate data suggest most new entrants were successful 
during the major period of DOT concern, 1995–1999, by the criterion 
of service to a city for a least a year following the establishment of at 
least 1% market share.228 In addition, entry was not followed by 
substantial fall in established carriers’ average fares,229 nor did those 
fares rise after low-fare carrier’s exit. Finally, the growth of LCC 
market penetration from 1999–2003 does not seem to have been the 
result of less aggressive competition by the established carriers.230  
Our view is that the current situation does not demand a clear 
new policy on predatory pricing for airlines and that the current 
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ambiguity on both sides of the Atlantic is probably benign. It appears 
unlikely that the FSC carriers in Europe will engage in targeted attacks 
on LCCs if for no other reason than a fear that DG Comp will follow 
the lead of the Bundeskartellamt. Moreover, it appears unlikely that 
EU Courts would find such an intervention illegal. And the prevailing 
ambiguity on the western side of the Atlantic may be discouraging 
possibly predatory behavior as well. The DOT’s legal position allows 
for non-specific action against unspecified behavior, and there is no 
recent indication that predatory behavior is seriously retarding the role 
of low-cost carriers. All carriers know that nothing other than 
Congressional action can prevent the DOT from intervening in a 
particular situation if it chooses to do so, despite the difficulty of a 
private claim. The usual national U.S. antitrust concern about sending 
clear economy-wide signals simply does not apply. Similar to the 
FTC’s use of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to attack Intel 
and achieve a settlement in 2009 without setting a precedent for the 
courts,231 the regulators can find an accommodation that does not 
extend beyond airlines and creates no precedent for private action. 
If the U.S. policy posture turned narrowly on below average 
variable cost pricing and recoupment in a single market, then the 
possibility of transatlantic conflict in cases involving possible 
predation might well arise. But as the earlier discussion made clear, 
the DOJ may have established in the American Airlines case that 
recoupment can involve multiple markets. Moreover, while DOT’s 
proposed solution to airline predation without a consideration of price-
cost relations was rejected, it still retains great latitude in its regulation 
of the industry for purposes of promoting competition.232 Put 
otherwise, both of the relevant U.S. enforcers have a history of 
pushing for close attention to predatory behavior and have been 
frustrated by other judicial and political forces. A plausible inference 
is that U.S. enforcers would be unlikely to object to strict EU 
enforcement and that they would sympathize with EU concerns about 
possible predatory behavior by U.S. firms. 
I. Market Imperfections Connected with Airport Facilities 
A major distinguishing feature of the airline industry globally is 
its dependence on specific complementary inputs such as airports and 
all measures for safety and security that are either publicly owned or 
subject to extensive continuous public regulation. 
                                                   
 231. GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 121. 
 232. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 203. 
 How is Competition Policy Coping? 649 
As the discussion below shows, limits imposed by airport 
facilities generate significant competitive effects at some U.S. 
airports. The problem, where it occurs, arises because of a scarcity of 
gates and slots (the use of airspace and ground facilities at a particular 
time) disproportionally affecting LCCs attempting to compete with 
legacy carriers. 
Particularly in a comparative policy context, gates and slots must 
be sharply distinguished. In the U.S., the disposition of both limited 
gate space and slots have typically been subject to administrative rules 
that have favored incumbents. In the U.S, but not in the EU, gates are 
commonly leased to airlines under exclusive long-term leases. 
Although the leasing airline sometimes subleases to other carriers for 
short terms, this arrangement keeps ultimate control in the hands of 
the long-term lessee. In the EU, the complex pattern of traffic 
involving many more carriers at most airports than is typical in the 
U.S has led to practices in which gates are now seldom controlled by 
specific carriers. 
In response to the concerns about entry in the 1990s, already 
discussed, in 2000 Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
and Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21).233 At 
airports in which a single airline generated more than 50% of the 
passenger volume, federal funding was to be contingent on the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) acceptance of a plan to increase 
competition in order for the airport to be eligible for federal financial 
aid.234 Empirical studies of the airports affected by that legislation, 
before and after its passage, reveal some important findings. Prior to 
the legislation, when the number of gates controlled by a carrier 
increased from 10 to 30%, fares increased by 3% and prices were 2% 
lower when sublease fees were controlled.235 And the price increases 
became more severe with congestion, defined as the ratio of flights to 
gates.236 Where there were 600 departures per gate per quarter, a 30% 
difference in gates leased led to a 6% change in fare, whereas at one-
third that level of congestion, the difference changed proportionally to 
2%.237 This suggests that where the AIR-21 legislation was seriously 
implemented, the impact on fares could have been substantial, and that 
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is what Snider and Williams found.238 Those airline markets that 
included one airport that implemented an approved competition plan 
experienced an average 13% price decline, and those markets with 
such airports at both ends had a 20% decline.239 There was some 
increased congestion but not enough to outweigh the gains from the 
very substantial price drops. This points to the desirability of increased 
airport facilities, but such expansion has been hindered by the $4.50 
cap on federal passenger facility charges that has been in place since 
2001.240 Large carriers have wanted neither an increased tax burden 
nor greater ease of entry for competitive carriers.241 
Another approach to increasing the effective capacity of airports 
in the U.S. is the sharing of gates. As leases have expired, an 
increasing number of U.S. airports have insisted on arrangements that 
increase the effective number of gates by obliging carriers to share.242 
Because gates in EU airports are generally not controlled by particular 
carriers,243 airport-generated constraints on entry within the EU are 
almost entirely due to the scarcity of slots. A sharp transatlantic 
difference looms here. In the U.S., the so-called High Density Rule of 
1969244 subjected five U.S. airports––Washington National (now 
Reagan National), LaGuardia, Kennedy, Newark, and O’Hare––to slot 
control, under which each airline had a fixed quota of takeoffs and 
landings at specific times.245 Today only Reagan National is under 
complete slot control, although the New York airports are subject to 
intermittent control. The issue of slot scarcity has remained 
sufficiently pressing, however, that as recently as the 
United/Continental merger in 2010 and the American/US Air merger 
in 2013, the Justice Department required extensive slot divestiture as 
a condition of its approval of the mergers.246 The issue of slot scarcity 
appears far more pressing in Europe where as many as eighty airports 
have slot control, although often only for peak times of the day.247  
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All EU airports are now subject to 2007-08 Commission rules 
that favor entrants in the allocation of slots and condemn any 
favoritism towards particular established carriers.248 This could be 
bolstered further by legislation pending in the European Parliament. 
One assessment notes: “It must also be pointed out that, even if the 
new entrant rule has not been overall extremely successful at 
promoting sustainable competition, it has made it possible for low-
cost airlines such as Ryanair and especially EasyJet to achieve 
significant growth at some congested airports.”249 In fact, an important 
recent trend in the EU is the increased use of main hubs rather than 
secondary airports by LCCs.250 
Further alleviation of the slot scarcity problem could generate 
further potential LCC competition in the EU. In the U.S., the problem 
of slot scarcity appears to be centered on New York area airports and 
on Reagan airport in Washington. Of these airports, Newark and 
Kennedy service transatlantic flights. Emergent LCC transatlantic 
competition could be affected at these airports.  
The role of the private sector in airport ownership varies greatly 
around the world. The current infrastructure of the U.S. air transport 
system is funded by a combination of local and federal monies, some 
of which come from airport use taxes and from bond issues.251 The 
bonds have sometimes been purchased by airlines, which can then 
enable them to exercise influence (“right in interest”) over airport 
expansion activity that could facilitate entry.252 In Canada, airports are 
leased by the federal government to not-for-profit private 
management, while in France and Germany, the government has 
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typically retained majority ownership.253 In Denmark, Austria, and 
Switzerland, private interests are controlling.254 In the UK, nearly 
every airport is private and operates at a moderate profit without 
regulation.255 In 2016, 47% of all European airports were “mostly” or 
“fully” private; this was a huge increase over the 23% figure in 2010.256 
Airport ownership has seen less change in the U.S. than almost 
anywhere due to the exemption of public bonding from federal 
taxation as well as the federal subsidies already noted.257 
Much of the large literature on the ownership and regulation of 
airports in recent years focuses on production efficiency, but 
competition issues are also considered.258 Gillen stresses that airports 
are an important example of a two-sided market: air passage on the 
one hand and all of the commercial activity in the airport on the 
other.259 In such a market, the volume of transactions depends on the 
structure as well as the level of fees.260 In particular, this dissolves any 
simple welfare relation between price and cost for a particular activity 
because of the externalities generated by the various prices across the 
platform.261 Intuitively, however, this still means that whatever is 
produced should take place at the lowest level of real cost and that 
consideration coupled with the pricing complications introduced by 
the two-sided market has drawn many observers to favor only light 
regulation of airports.262 This may, in some circumstances, create a 
tension between maximum opportunity for entrants and various 
financial commitments from established carriers.263 But, whatever the 
ownership structure, there is nearly always some public oversight, and 
that oversight, not just in North America and Europe but in many other 
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parts of the world as well, typically features access for entrants as a 
major and growing concern.264 
The intent of Congress, the DOT, and the DOJ to promote 
maximum gate and slot availability in the U.S. is clear and consistent, 
but the effectuation of those goals lies with the myriad public 
authorities that control the operation and expansion of U.S. airports. 
One generalization appears safe: Nearly all U.S. airport managements 
now recognize that public interest demands demonstrated attention to 
the promotion of competition, and positive action seems to be growing 
almost everywhere. In the EU, dedicated gates are not common, but 
slot favoritism based on historic use prevails in many places. 
Nonetheless, complaints by disfavored airlines appear to generate 
intervention.265 The EU has decided that airports are “undertakings” 
that must be run as commercial enterprises, and an element of that 
behavior must be nondiscrimination among carriers.266 Sluggishness 
in slot availability continues to impede entry in the EU but it is not an 
insurmountable barrier.267 While fully functional slot trading is not yet 
the norm, it represents a feasible public policy goal on both sides of 
the Atlantic.268 
III. POLICY COMPATIBILITY IN A WORLD OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES 
The discussion so far has considered U.S. and EU developments 
as parallel phenomena along with some considerations of policy 
congruence.269 But airlines are subject to unusual restrictions about 
national ownership and operations. The competitive significances of 
these considerations need explicit attention.  
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A. Airlines as an International Industry 
The 1944 Chicago Convention saw a confident U.S. favoring a 
major role for markets in international air transport, while the rest of 
world, and notably Europe, feared U.S. domination. Much has been 
written here about the distinctive characteristics of airlines, but trade 
in air services shares two principal characteristics with other 
international trade. First, there is a general presumption in economics 
that the lowest cost provider globally will best serve national 
purchasers and, second, that vulnerable national providers will use any 
and all arguments and influence to stave off foreign competition.  
The nascent airline industry in many countries began between 
the world wars in an environment of national security concerns about 
the emerging significance of air power and often with strong economic 
encouragement to source aircraft nationally. Air power played an 
important role in World War I and was certain to be critical in any 
future conflict. In addition, national airlines needed to be a dependable 
resource for national security purposes and for other emergency 
deployment. And from the beginning there was a critical concern for 
safety. This concern, too, argued for keeping control as reliable and 
transparent as possible––and thus restriction to nationals.270 These 
concerns were codified in American New Deal legislation restricting 
foreign ownership,271 and similar restrictions were adopted in most 
other countries.272  
As post-war air traffic grew, it was quickly recognized that most 
high-income countries had comparably effective airline safety 
standards. And economies of scale—and particularly of accumulated 
output273—drove most national aircraft manufacturers from the 
market, thus removing another rationale for protection. But this still 
left the national “flag carriers” in many European states as proud, 
usually government owned, national symbols and often influential 
lobbies for an essentially mercantilist policy.274 Bilateral agreements 
were struck that typically closely balanced national access offered for 
the foreign access gained.275 This, of course, completely ignores the 
objectives of air travelers and others who gain from cheaper 
international travel to more destinations. The stylized history of recent 
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decades finds increasing policy dominance of this latter group. 
Nevertheless, the industry has remained singular in many respects 
including its almost complete detachment from the various 
liberalizations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and, more recently, the World Trade Organization’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).276 
B. The Many “Freedoms”  
The language of international air transport liberalization 
employs nine categories of “freedom,” only the first two of which have 
been largely non-controversial throughout. The original five 
“freedoms” entered public discourse at the 1944 Chicago Convention, 
which generated a Two Freedoms Agreement277 and a Five Freedoms 
Agreement.278 Although the U.S. initially endorsed the ambitious Five 
Freedoms Agreement, it ultimately withdrew from it, perhaps because 
it reduced the leverage that the Americans would have in bilateral 
deals. After the U.S. withdrew, the pursuit of multilateralism 
floundered, and the nations of the world pursued a mercantilist 
aviation policy.279  
Over time other freedoms have been added to the five identified 
at the Convention.280 The first freedom is simply the right by a flight 
originating in B to fly over national territory of A.281 The second 
freedom is the right of flights from B to land for maintenance and 
refueling in A.282 The third and fourth freedoms are the right of airlines 
in A to take passengers to B and vice versa.283 The fifth freedom is the 
right of a B-based carrier to pick up or deliver passengers from third-
                                                   
 276. See BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR 
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 526-28 (2009). The GATS of 1995, one of the basic treaties 
of the World Trade Organization, recognized the obduracy of these special 
characteristics and completely omitted flight services from its very limited and highly 
qualified coverage of air travel services. See id. at 526 n.31. A certain limited 
subsectors of non-flight air service activities have been considered. See id. 
 277. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 1, 
59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389. 
 278. International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 1, 59 Stat. 
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387. 
 279. Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Restoring Global Aviation’s 
“Cosmopolitan Mentalité”, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-14 (2011). 
 280. See Freedoms of the Air, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018), https://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx [https://perma.cc/W7WX-
CWYB]. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See id. 
656 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
country airports to an airport in A.284 The sixth freedom is the right of 
a carrier from B to use one of B’s airports as a link between third-party 
traffic and an airport in A.285 The seventh freedom in the right of an 
airline in A to move traffic between countries B and C completely 
unconnected with origin or destination in A.286 The eighth freedom is 
the granting of a right by A for an airline from B to move passengers 
between designated airports in A so long as the flight either begins or 
ends in B.287 Finally, the ninth freedom is complete non-
discrimination—cabotage: the ability of a foreign airline to move 
passengers from one national airport to another without restriction.288 
Convinced of the competitive potential of its own carriers, to 
meet the increasing demands of its high income travelling public and 
to promote more foreign expenditure in the U.S., the Carter 
Administration pursued bilateral, open skies agreements that aimed to 
make supply and demand the principal drivers of both air fares and 
flight frequency. The first agreement, with the Netherlands, came into 
force in 1992; it gave unrestricted landing rights on its soil to airlines 
registered in the other country.289 Many similar agreements 
followed.290 The most recent significant U.S. agreement was with 
Japan in 2010. Other bilateral and multilateral agreements elsewhere 
in the world in recent years not involving the United States have 
followed the open skies pattern.291  
The most comprehensive agreement so far was struck by the 
U.S. and the EU in 2007.292 It opened all U.S. and EU airports to all 
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U.S. and EU airlines.293 Moreover, it promised a range of cooperative 
activity on many matters including competition policy.294 
A recent study by Winston and Yan estimates a huge saving from 
the U.S. open skies agreements up to 2015.295 Their simulations find 
at least $4 billion in annual gains to purchasers in the affected 
markets.296 They estimate that another $4 billion gain could be 
achieved if similar agreements could be struck between the U.S. and 
all other significant national airline markets.297  
C. From Ownership Restrictions to Alliances 
One of the most challenging policy issues today, the proper 
treatment of “alliances,” grows directly from the national roots of the 
Chicago Convention of 1944, which, despite considerable 
liberalization, still prevails. Although recent bilateral agreements are 
far more market-oriented than in earlier decades, aviation remains a 
singular industry in its almost universal rejection of controlling 
foreign ownership of domestically-registered airlines and its granting 
of cabotage only to those airlines.298 Liberalization has been modest: 
The 2007 U.S–EU Agreement relaxed some ownership restrictions, 
maintaining a 25% ceiling on voting equity and a 49.9% ceiling on 
total equity but with the additional provision that more than 50% 
ownership would be considered on a case-by-case basis.299  
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Unsurprisingly, the airlines have sought ways to extend the 
range of their markets by working around ownership restrictions.300 
Alliances are agreements that have developed in the airline industry 
that involve various forms of cooperation.301 This cooperation can vary 
from basic arms-length arrangements involving code-sharing, lounge 
access, and/or frequent-flyer programs to highly integrated joint 
ventures in which the parties share revenues or profits.302 At present, 
there are three major alliances: Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and 
oneworld.303 The degrees of cooperation vary within each of the major 
alliances.304 Thus there are twenty-six members of the Star Alliance 
but only three members participate in that alliance’s joint venture (Air 
Canada, Lufthansa, and United).305 Similarly, there are twelve 
members of SkyTeam but only three in that alliance’s joint venture 
(Air France-KLM, Alitalia, and Delta).306 Finally, there are eleven 
members of oneworld but only three in oneworld’s joint venture 
(American, BA, and Iberia).307 Competitive concerns focus mainly on 
the joint ventures that involve profit sharing.308  
In an alliance involving a profit-sharing joint venture, the 
partners’ shares of the venture’s profits are not affected by the 
ownership of the planes employed on any given flight.309 The airlines 
refer to such alliances as “metal neutral” in the sense that the parties 
are indifferent to the passengers’ choices of carrier for any and all of 
the venture’s flights.310 Their sole interest is in the maximization of the 
venture’s profits.311 
D. U.S. Alliance Policy 
The DOT possesses the authority to grant immunity from the 
antitrust laws to airline agreements that it finds not contrary to the 
public interest and must disapprove of any agreement “that 
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substantially reduces or eliminates competition” unless the 
Transportation Secretary determines that the agreement “is necessary 
to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important public 
benefits.”312 The DOT has been using this authority to approve various 
alliances since 1992 and has granted immunity to the three main 
alliances: SkyTeam,313 Star Alliance,314 and oneworld.315 Like the DOJ 
in approving some recent mergers, the DOT has required releases of 
slots as a condition of granting alliance antitrust immunity.316 In the 
case of the oneworld alliance, for example, the DOJ required that slots 
at London’s Heathrow airport, a slot-constrained airport, be released 
as a condition of granting antitrust immunity.317 
E. EU Alliance Policy 
The European Commission regularly assesses mergers in the 
airline industry, such as the attempts by Ryanair to acquire Aer 
Lingus, which was found to involve excessive reduction of 
competition on the same routes.318 Under EU competition law, airline 
alliances are generally viewed as contractual arrangements involving 
less integration than a merger.319 Accordingly, they are governed by 
Article 101 of the Treaty and Functioning of the European Union 
(Article 101) and only rarely by the Merger Regulation.320 Their 
evaluation follows the structure of that Article: Under Article 101’s 
first clause, an assessment is made of the competitive effects of the 
transaction under review.321 If the agreement or practice is determined 
to lessen competition, then the analysis proceeds to a second step in 
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which an assessment is made of the resulting efficiencies and whether 
those efficiencies are great enough to offset the reduction in 
competition.322 This format is the one that would presumably be used 
in the evaluation of air carrier alliances, should a formal proceeding 
involving alliances proceed to conclusion. But, as we will see, 
proceedings involving alliances tend not to reach the point where the 
Commission makes formal conclusions of fact or law. 
The Commission’s powers over air transport have evolved 
unevenly, reaching apparent maturity only in 2004 in Regulation 
411/2004.323 Before 2004, the Commission’s authority over 
international air transport was not broadly spelled out. In most of the 
areas in which the Commission enforces competition law, it acts under 
regulations authorizing it to investigate and impose penalties; 
respondents’ rights to be heard are also guaranteed.324 In 1962, 
however, the Council ruled that Regulation 17/62,325 which gave this 
authorization for the Commission generally, did not apply to 
transport.326 As a result, the Council began to issue a series of 
regulations providing the Commission with the needed authority over 
particular forms of transport. The Council acted on inland transport 
(rail, road, and inland waterways) in 1968,327 maritime transport in 
1986,328 and air transport internal to the EU in 1986.329 But only in 2004 
was international air transport (between the EU and other nations) 
added.330 The Commission reviewed international airline agreements 
for many years before it was given specific authority over the air 
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transport sector.331 The Commission had been reviewing and 
approving airline alliances conditioned on the release of slots by the 
alliance members since 1998 when it approved a 1996 alliance 
between American Airlines and British Airways.332 In 2002, it 
approved a transatlantic alliance between Northwest Airlines and 
KLM333 and an alliance among Lufthansa, SAS, and United Airlines.334  
Changes in the EU’s procedures for the enforcement of 
competition law have impacted the Commission’s approach to airline 
alliances. As noted above, Article 101’s first clause appears to cast a 
wide net, prohibiting all agreements and concerted practices that affect 
competition among the Member States.335 Article 101’s third clause, 
however, provides for exemptions from these prohibitions for 
agreements that enhance efficiency.336 At least initially, the invocation 
of Article 101’s third clause was understood to require specific action 
by the Commission. This form of regulation underlies Council 
Regulation No. 17/62,337 which requires the Commission’s approval 
for the validation of agreements.  
The European authorities soon discovered that this ex ante 
method of administration overtaxed the Commission’s resources. The 
result was Council Regulation No. 19/65, under which the 
Commission was authorized to issue so-called bloc exemptions for all 
agreements and concerted practices that fit defined categories.338 
Formally, the administration of competition law continued to adhere 
to an ex ante enforcement model (requiring advance Commission 
approval), although firms were allowed to self-apply the bloc 
exemptions. In 2003, however, the Council moved to an ex post model 
where Commission action takes place after the fact. Under Council 
Regulation No. 1/2003, agreements and concerted practices of 
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business firms are deemed prima facie lawful and must be challenged 
by the Commission (which bears the burden of proof)339 and ruled in 
violation of Article 101 before they are deemed unlawful. Regulation 
No. 1/2003 also authorizes the Commission to accept commitments of 
parties, making them legally binding and obviating the grounds for 
enforcement action.340 In cases in which the Commission accepts 
commitments from the parties, Regulation No. 1/2003 contemplates 
that there is no need for the Commission to reach a conclusion as to 
whether there is, or has been, a violation.341  
These enforcement changes become manifest for airlines in 
Council Regulation No. 487/2009, which authorizes the Commission 
to adopt regulations over air transport (including international air 
transport), involving, inter alia, joint planning and coordination of 
airline schedules and consultation on tariffs for the carriage of 
passengers and joint operations on “new less busy” scheduled air 
services.342  
These regulations now inform the Commission’s general 
approval of alliances in return for the airlines releasing slots at 
congested airports. The Commission appears to believe that the best 
way to foster competition in the airline industry lies in the removal of 
barriers to entry and that divesting slots from FSCs and making them 
available to LCCs is the most promising technique for achieving this 
goal. So far the Commission has been pursuing this goal through 
negotiation. Regulation 1/2003 fosters negotiation by reducing the 
confrontational relationship between the Commission and its 
negotiating partners in several ways. First, because Regulation 1/2003 
has adopted an ex post model of enforcement, the parties are 
presumptively acting lawfully and can enter into agreements with the 
Commission without destroying that presumption. Second, the 
regulation allows the parties to make binding commitments without an 
admission or a finding of violation. Thus, the parties can commit to 
freeing up slots without admitting that their prior (or present) behavior 
was (or is) unlawful. And a Commission ruling condemning their 
behavior is unnecessary to make their commitments legally binding.  
Regulation 487/2009 also shapes enforcement. It confers on the 
Commission the authority to bloc-exempt by category a range of 
agreements from the prohibitions of Article 101(1) because they are 
                                                   
 339. See Commission Regulation 1/2003, art. 2, 2003 J.O. (L 1) 8. The burden 
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 341. See id. pmbl. cl. 13.  
 342. See Council Regulation 487/ 2009, art. 2, 2009 J.O. (L 148) 1, 2. 
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efficiency-enhancing and therefore justified under Article 101(3).343 
Whether it is necessary to issue bloc exemptions under the new ex post 
regime established by Council Regulation No. 1/2003 is a moot point 
because the Council has continued to authorize the Commission to 
issue bloc exemptions, and the Commission has complied.344 
The kinds of agreements favored by Regulation 487 include joint 
planning and coordination of airline schedules;345 consultation on fares 
for the carriage of passengers and baggage and of freight on scheduled 
air services; and joint operations on new “less busy” scheduled air 
services.346 This structure implies that the Council sees these kinds of 
agreements—or versions of them—as at least potentially efficiency 
enhancing. Agreements involving joint planning and coordination of 
schedules and consultation on prices are part of current major airline 
alliances.  
From the perspective of the issues connected with modern airline 
alliances, the Regulation’s reference to agreements involving joint 
operations on new “less busy” scheduled air services is somewhat 
puzzling because current alliances involve joint operations on very 
busy scheduled air services. It is possible that the Council meant to 
disapprove these alliances, but that is unlikely because the 
Commission has already given its approval to several of them.347 
Rather, the Regulation is probably intended to require the Commission 
to examine joint operations on a case-by-case basis instead of 
regulating them categorically. 
The Commission approved of an alliance among Air France 
(which had already merged with KLM), Alitalia, and Delta in 2015,348 
and it approved of an alliance involving Continental, United, 
Lufthansa, and Air Canada in 2013.349 Earlier, the Commission 
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Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2002 O.J. (C 181) 3. 
 348. See Summary of Commission Decision of 12 May 2015 Relating to a 
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approved an alliance between Air France and Alitalia in 2004350 and 
alliances between KLM and Northwest Airlines351 and among 
Lufthansa, SAS, and United in 2002.352 The Commission upheld an 
alliance between KLM and Alitalia under the Merger Regulation in 
1999.353  
Since 2004, the Commission has first tentatively found that the 
alliance it was reviewing impeded competition in violation of Article 
101(1). It then reassessed that conclusion in the light of commitments 
made by the parties to divest slots at congested airports. In the light of 
these commitments, the Commission then concluded that a requisite 
degree of competition was being maintained without further formal 
remedies.354 This is contemplated by Regulation 1/2003 in which the 
Commission obtains results that it desires without making a formal 
determination of a violation.355 But when the Commission is acting 
under Regulation 487, its authority comes ultimately from Article 
101(3) whose application is the subject of Regulation 487.356 So, the 
Commission’s approval of the alliance in question must be based on 
the efficiencies generated by the alliance. It is not entirely clear why 
the release of slots (which has to do with engendering future 
competition) constitutes an efficiency generated by the alliance and 
thus grounds for its approval. This largely theoretical difficulty stems 
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from the bifurcated structure of Article 101 that formally requires 
separate determinations of competitive impact and newly generated 
efficiencies. 
F. Comparing the Treatment of Alliances in the U.S. and the EU  
As suggested above, the growth of strong LCC competition in 
both the U.S. and the EU has affected the competitive stance of the 
enforcement agencies in both jurisdictions. The largest air carriers in 
both the U.S and the EU are LCCs: Southwest Airlines and Ryanair.357 
The expansion of the LCCs in the U.S. domestic market has been 
dramatic, and they are currently exerting significant downward 
pressure on the pricing of legacy carriers.358 Similar effects are 
generated by Ryanair and other LCCs on the pricing of FSCs in the 
EU. As we have argued elsewhere, the increased competitive pressure 
from the LCCs was probably a major factor influencing the DOJ to 
approve the recent mergers by the legacy carriers.359 Now the LCCs 
are about to enter the transatlantic market. Some LCCs such as WOW! 
and Norwegian Air have entered, or are about to enter, that market, 
and Ryanair is exploring the possibility of entry.360 The DOT and the 
European Commission undoubtedly see the entry of LCCs into the 
transatlantic market as likely to exert downward pressure on fares. 
This leads to their emphasis on slots to maximize the ease of entry into 
a set of markets, presumably including those across the Atlantic. 
The DOT has granted antitrust immunity to the three major 
alliances.361 In the case of oneworld, the DOT required the parties to 
divest some slots for the benefit of LCCs.362 The European 
Commission has also granted approval to the three major alliances 
after extracting commitments from the alliances to divest slots for the 
benefit of LCCs in congested airports.363 It appears therefore that the 
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European Commission, the DOT, and the DOJ all see the emergence 
of strong LCCs as a major path to fostering greater competition in the 
airline industry. Although the DOT’s understanding of the competitive 
impact of airline cooperation is broader than that of the Commission 
(and of the DOJ) in the sense that the DOT can take into account 
competitive effects beyond a relevant antitrust market on which the 
Commission (and the DOJ) would focus, the Commission and the 
DOT both recognize the important role played by LCCs and the need 
to foster LCC competition by reducing the barriers to market entry that 
arise from slot scarcity. As a result, both agencies take a common 
approach toward slot divesture at congested airports and generally 
reach consistent results. This compatibility is reflected in their 2010 
joint report on airline alliances.364 And it is also compatible with the 
logic of DOJ’s three major recent merger approvals.365 
The growth of strong LCC competition in both the U.S. and the 
EU has affected the way that the enforcement agencies in both 
jurisdictions approach the evaluation of alliances and mergers in the 
airline industry. The actual and/or potential increase in LCC 
competition has reduced the anticompetitive effects likely to be 
generated by the joint operations taking place in each of the three 
major alliances. This growing LCC competition has enabled the 
agencies to more readily recognize enhancements of product quality, 
such as network expansions and increased flights as well the cost 
savings generated by the integrations.  
The alliances appear to generate significant efficiencies of 
density, scale, and scope. They can also eliminate the double 
marginalization that would prevail without inter-airline cooperation.366 
Among the scholars evaluating the effects of alliances on interline 
passengers are Brueckner and Whalen367 who, in their model, highlight 
welfare gains by passengers traveling beyond the partners’ hubs that 
are likely to outweigh contrary effects on hub-to-hub travelers.368 But 
this particular efficiency was recently challenged by Gillespie and 
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Richard, who claimed that airlines could apportion revenue between 
cooperating airlines through arms-length bargaining,369 although this 
alternative would probably generate additional transactions costs. 
Gillespie and Richard are thus questioning whether the elimination of 
double marginalization is a “merger specific” efficiency under the 
merger guidelines.370 Yet the elimination of double marginalization is 
widely recognized as an efficiency in vertical mergers involving 
distribution, where arms-length bargaining is also a theoretical 
alternative.371 Both the DOJ and the European Commission so 
recognize it. Perhaps the merger guidelines are adverting to such 
issues when they state that “[t]he Agencies do not insist upon a less 
restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.”372 
Whether joint-venture operation is necessary to prevent double 
marginalization, the alliances appear to generate the other efficiencies 
mentioned.373 Carriers can serve more markets when they act 
cooperatively, filling a larger aircraft with passengers that otherwise 
would be divided among the separate airlines composing the 
alliance.374 Hub-and-spoke organization, as is common in the airlines 
and other modes of transportation, helps reduce average trip costs,375 
and the more spokes serving the hub, the stronger are the likely 
economies of scope. Such efficiencies can offset increases in price that 
result from consolidation and cooperation, if the efficiencies are 
sufficiently large.376 So, both the downward pressure on prices 
resulting from LCC competition and cognizable efficiencies from firm 
consolidation or cooperation appear critical to airline antitrust 
evaluation.377 
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Bilokach and Hüschelrath recently suggested granting the U.S. 
antitrust immunity for only five years until the impact of the three huge 
alliances can be more fully understood.378 This could be mandated by 
Congress, as suggested by the late Congressman James Oberstar of 
Minnesota (who favored three years).379 If the profitability of the 
routes involved rises excessively with concomitant erosion of 
consumer surplus, immunity could be withdrawn on one or more of 
the alliances (or alliance components).380 But it bears repeating that 
most of the major airlines involved in the alliances––particularly those 
based outside of the U.S.––have not yet shown financial health 
sustained for more than a few years.  
IV. COMPETITORS FROM OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC AREA 
As recently as 1995, the U.S. and Europe accounted for 64% of 
global passenger traffic. That figure was 52.3% in 2016, and it is 
forecast to drop to 36% by 2036.381 The major growth markets are in 
Asia and in China in particular.382 What does this portend for 
international competition?  
Air China is a member of the Star Alliance,383 and China Eastern 
and China Southern are members of SkyTeam.384 Nevertheless, 
experts have concluded that China has made a strategic decision to 
protect its home market and to nurture “national champions.”385 As 
familiar as that sounds as an element of industrial policy, it is hard to 
translate into tangible international competitive advantage in this 
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industry.386 Airlines provide services that differ dramatically from 
most other products and services, particularly in an international 
context. They produce a service, much of which is produced and 
delivered abroad employing capital equipment which, for the 
foreseeable future, will be sourced for long-haul international 
operations from the duopoly of Boeing and Airbus.387 International or 
local markets for fuel and facilities offer no differential advantage to 
the Chinese. Finally, direct labor costs for most carriers is only about 
25%, and China’s ability to exploit that advantage drops with each 
passing year. Chinese airlines can nonetheless provide powerful 
competition throughout Asia.388 
Much has been written recently about the Gulf based airlines: 
Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad. Qatar joined oneworld in 2013, but Sir 
Tim Clark, chairman of Emirates has decried what he sees as the 
alliances’ cartel-like behavior and particularly their ability to block 
routes for new members.389 These Gulf carriers are well placed to link 
Asia to Europe, and their experienced European managers have 
recently put price pressure on the major U.S. and EU carriers by 
operating through major European hubs. This has led to accusations 
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of “capacity dumping” and government subsidies.390 The accusations 
parallel the complaints of beleaguered domestic competitors in goods 
markets.391 
It appears that much of the overall competitive advantage of the 
Gulf carriers lies with their new aircraft, their cultural congeniality 
with many present and future travelers, and the attraction of the hub 
airport locations that boast some of the greatest tourist attractions in 
the Muslim world nearby.392 The Gulf carriers seem likely to put 
continuing downwards pressure on transatlantic fares.  
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CONCLUSION 
The current transatlantic airline competition regime and, by 
extension, the global regime presents a unique combination of special 
government regulations and familiar competition policy challenges. 
The central reality underlying the need for rough congruence in policy 
lies in the extraterritoriality of antitrust jurisdiction.393 This means that 
if any business practice on either side of the Atlantic has a substantial 
effect on competitive conditions on the other side, authorities on either 
side may intervene and either veto the practice or reach some other 
accommodation.394 But based on the previous discussion, the policy 
differences affecting airline operation are not very substantial and are 
unlikely to generate substantial conflict. Both the U.S. and the EU, in 
very different institutional contexts, seem similarly attentive to the 
major barriers to effective competition in airlines.   
One obvious path towards a more competitive Atlantic market 
would be to allow for cabotage on both sides from airlines registered 
in the U.S. and the EU. The current protectionist mood in the U.S. and 
in many EU countries probably makes that a non-starter, at least for 
the near future. A less extreme shift would be the relaxation of foreign 
ownership restrictions, but it has yet to be demonstrated that 
competition problems on either side of the Atlantic stem from 
inadequate capital.395 Instead, most investors are likely wary of an 
industry with such a history of red ink.  
Considering the near future of competitive performance of 
airlines in both the U.S. and the EU, our most optimistic scenario––
and not one we think unlikely––is that a relatively stable set of low-
cost carriers will emerge in transatlantic air service that will greatly 
influence the behavior of the full-service carriers. This has already 
been observed within both the U.S. and EU markets separately, and 
nothing now appears likely to block its development internationally. 
This group seems likely to include Ryanair and EasyJet––firms with a 
solid record of success in disciplining FSCs––and perhaps also 
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Southwest, which is experimenting with international service 
(although so far only to Mexico and the Caribbean). Moreover, 
success with disciplining the FSCs on Atlantic routes could be the 
precursor to a playing similar role on other international routes.396 
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